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The Indonesian Constitutional System  





Abstract : The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was amended for four times 
between 1999 and 2002) in the reformation era. These constitutional changes have altered the 
principles and the structure of the Indonesian primary state‟s institutions. Broadly speaking, all 
of the power branches – i.e. legislative, executive and judiciary organs– are now interrelated 
horizontally in running the country and none of them is superior to the others. Such constitu-
tional system is generally found in countries that employ a presidential system. However, by 
reviewing the authority hold by the legislatures, it is found that some characteristics of a parlia-
mentary system are also applied in Indonesia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The amendments of the 1945 Indonesian 
Constitution (UUD)
1
 through four ple-
nary sessions of the People's Consulta-
tive Assembly (MPR)2 – conducted in 
1999 to 2002 – can be said a revolution-
ary constitutional changes. Within the 
newly amended Constitution, there are 
                                                          
1
 Hereinafter cited as UUD  
2
 Hereinafter cited as MPR 
74 new articles that regulated 174 provi-
sions – and only approximately 25 pro-
visions that remaining from the original 
UUD of 1945. Furthermore, the changes 
of the Indonesian Constitution are not 
limited to add or subtract the authority of 
the primary state‟s institutions, but also 
fundamentally changed the role of those 
institutions. 
However, a constitutional change is 
something that should be anticipated. 
From the very beginning when UUD of 
1945 was ratified on August 18, 1945, 
Soekarno – one of a prominent founding 
father and the first President of the Re-
public of Indonesia – in his speech said 
that the UUD of 1945 is a rushed Consti-
tution that would be fixed sometime in 
the future when the national stability has 
well established and the environment has 
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supported to make another constitutional 
change. Therefore, from the beginning it 
is realized that the status of the UUD of 
1945 is actually a provision/ temporary 
Constitution. 
An attempt to change the Constitu-
tion was tried in 1955 general elections 
that formed the Constitutional Assembly 
(Konstituante) in order to establish a 
permanent Constitution for the Republic 
of Indonesia – replacing the Provisional 
Constitution (UUD Sementara) of 1950.
3
 
But, the efforts that have been spent for a 
constitutional change failed due to con-
siderable debate and conflict between 
different political factions which resulted 
to the parliamentary deadlock and politi-
cal turmoil that led to the stipulation of 
the Presidential Decree on the 5
th
 of July 
1959 that re-imposed the UUD of 1945. 
Regardless of the absence of an aca-
demic draft as a pre-conceptual frame-
work with regard to these constitutional 
changes in the Reformation situation that 
required a rapid pace to response the 
changing conditions, it is more important 
to carefully observe the changes them-
selves that have happened in the UUD of 
1945.  
                                                          
3
 The UUD of 1945 was ineffective due to 
political disturbances and military conflicts as 
resulted from the disputes between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands, until the Round Table 
Conference was conducted in Den Haag that 
resulted to the recognition of the Netherlands to 
the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS/ the United 
States of Indonesia) and its Constitution 
(Konstitusi RIS) that would be effective on 
December 27, 1949. The political dynamics in 
Indonesia resulted to the reunification of 
Indonesia and led to the replacement of the 
Konstitusi RIS with the UUD Sementara 
(Temporary/Provisional Constitution) of 1950 
that was ratified on August 17, 1950. 
There are at least two important 
things that can be identified in these 
cons-titutional changes. Firstly, the 
paradigm shift on the constitutional law; 
and, secondly, the institutional changes. 
These constitutional changes have 
dragged the Indonesian entering the new 
political arena that completely different 
from the previous three decades. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Paradigm Shift on the Constitutional 
Law 
The UUD of 1945 comprises of different 
vision and mission between the pre- and 
the post-amendments. The debate on the 
conception of the unitary state of Indo-
nesia (integralistik staatsidee)
4
 which is 
until 1994 has been questioned of 
whether such integralistik staatsidee has 
really vanished? Indeed, for 32 years of 
the Suharto‟s New Order era, the state‟s 
powers were concentrated in his hands 
as the President of the Republic of Indo-
nesia under the UUD of 1945. This phe-
nomenon – which is called „executive 
heavy‟5 – has challenged the Soepomo‟s 




Is the 32 years of the Suharto‟s New 
Order era, as well as the previous 
                                                          
4
 Hereinafter cited as integralistik staatsidee 
5
 Referred to the 16 articles out of 37 articles of 
the pre-amended UUD of 1945 that regulates the 
authority of the President, practically the 
Constitution provides a maximum authority to 
the President to become a conductor of 
governmental symphony. 
6
 Professor Soepomo is the principal drafter of 
the UUD of 1945.Sekretariat Negara, Risalah 
Sidang BPUPKI dan PPKI,3
rd
 Ed.,Jakarta: Sek-
retariat Negara, 1995; Marsilam Simanjun-
tak,Pandangan Negara Integralistik, 1st Ed.,  
Jakarta: Grafiti, 1994. 
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Soekarno‟s Old Order era are in accord 
with the UUD of 1945 as intended by the 
founding fathers of Indonesia? Are they 
reflected the paradigm of the ‘integral-
istik’ state of Indonesia? If it is so, thus 
the governmental practices have failed in 
maintaining with just the pluralistic 
country in ethnicity, religiosity, culture, 
and social system of the Indonesian peo-
ple who inhabited about 17,000 large 
and small islands. It is no wonder to find 
that the first constitutional change fo-
cused on reducing the power of the 
president. Among others, the changes 
have been made to limit the presidential 
terms of no more than two times (Article 
7 of the amended UUD of 1945), the 
primary power to make a law is trans-
ferred to the House of Representatives 
(DPR) [Art. 5 (1) and 20 of the amended 
UUD of 1945], the appointment for an 
ambassador and consular is required the 
considerations of the DPR (Article 13 of 
the amended UUD of 1945), the grant 
for a pardon and rehabilitation should 
take into account the considerations from 
the Supreme Court (MA)
7
 [Article 14 (1) 
of the amended UUD of 1945], the grant 
for an amnesty and abolition should take 
into account the considerations from the 
DPR [Article 14 (2) of the amended 
UUD of 1945], the grant for a title, deco-
ration, and other honors should follow 
the law (Article 15 of the amended UUD 
of 1945). The spirit behind these consti-
tutional changes is to reduce the presi-
dential powers and, at the same time, to 
strengthen the functions of the House of 
Representatives. 
                                                          
7
 Hereinafter cited as MA 
The existence of the MPR in the 
pre-amended UUD of 1945 has been 
questioned in term of its position as the 
highest state institution. Within this posi-
tion, the MPR becomes superior to all 
other primary state institutions – i.e.: the 
President, the DPR, the MA, the DPA 
(Supreme Advisory Council), and the 
BPK (State Audit Agency). 
The role of the MPR in representing 
the sovereignty of the Indonesian people 
is also doubted on whether this institu-
tion is truly reflecting the Indonesian 
people primarily because most of its 
members are appointed by the President 
and not elected by the people. Further-
more, for decades the MPR has served 
more in the inaugural ceremony rather 
than in the election for the president. 
Therefore, in the third amendment, the 
function of the MPR was reduced and 
the MPR no longer positioned as the sole 
state institution that representing the 
sovereignty of the Indonesian people.
8
 
The shifts on the authority of the 
President, the DPR, and the MPR – i.e.: 
the role of the President that no longer 
dominating the governmental powers, 
the strengthened role of the DPR, and 
the lowering position of the MPR that no 
longer as the highest state institution – 
reflecting the paradigm shift in adminis-
tering the state. 
These shifts, for many of the experts 
in constitutional law, indicate that the 
today‟s constitutional system in Indone-
sia is categorized as a pure presidential 
                                                          
8
 In the amended UUD of 1945, it defines in the 
Article 1 (2) of the amended UUD of 1945 that 
the sovereignty belongs to the people and 
exercised in accordance with the Constitution. 
The Indonesian Constitutional System in the Post Amendement of the 1945 Constitution 




 However, some other experts 
are doubt it because they have found that 
some of the characteristics of a parlia-






Among the institutional changes is the 
elimination some of the state institutions, 
such as the Supreme Advisory Council– 
through the deletion of Chapter IV Arti-
cle 16 of the UUD of 1945. The DPA 
has served as the institution that respon-
sible to provide answers to the Presi-
dent‟s question. The DPA also has the 
rights to deliver a proposal to the Presi-
dent. As the primary state institution 
with advisory functions, the DPA has 
had no significant roles and essential 
contributions to the state‟s administra-
tion throughout the history. It was found 
that the DPA in the last two decades has 
served as a place for the retired state of-
ficials. 
Another form of constitutional 
changes is the establishment of new in-
stitutions, such the Senate (DPD). The 
emergence of the DPD is closely linked 
                                                          
9
Shepherd L. Witman and John J. Wuest, Com-
parative Government, New Jersey: Littlefield, 
Adams & Co., 1963. Witman, Shepherd L. and 
John J. Wuest provide the characteristic of a 
presidential system as follows: 1) It is based 
upon the separation of power principle; 2) There 
is executive has no power to dissolve the legisla-
tive nor must he resign when he loses the support 
of the majority of its membership; 3) There is no 
mutual responsibility between the president and 
his cabinet; the latter is wholly responsibility to 
the chief executive; 4) The executive (the chief 
executive) is chosen by the electorate. 
10
The DPR owns the characteristics of a 
parliamentary system, such as: having the rights 
for an interpellation, the rights for inquiry, and 
the freedom of expression [Article 20A (2) of the 
amended UUD of 1945]. 
to the idea of bicameralism. Following 
the tradition in a unitary state, it is a soft-
bicameralism that has been chosen. Al-
though, due to the fact that the future 
policy of regional autonomy tends to be 
a federalist one, some political scientists 
believe that a strong-bicameralism is 
more appropriate for Indonesia.
11
 Within 
the soft bicameralism, the role of the 
DPD is not equal to the DPR, whereas 
the DPR remains stronger than the 
DPD
12
 – even though the Article 22D of 
the Constitution granted the DPD a sig-
nificant role as the local representatives.  
Since the Indonesian Parliament is 
represented by three chambers – i.e.: the 
MPR, the DPR, and the DPD, Asshid-
diqie named the parliamentary structure 
in Indonesia as ‘tricameralism’ – mainly 
be-cause each of these three Parliamen-
tary institutions has its own authority, 
administrative organization, and chair-
men of their own.
13
 
Another new primary state institu-
tion is the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitutional Court is a phenomenon of 
the twentieth century. Austria is the first 
country in the world that establishes a 
Constitutional Court. The establishment 
of this judiciary institution has been in-
spired by the idea of Hans Kelsen (in 
1920s). In Indonesia, the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court is in line with 
the democratization process appeared in 
the Reformation era.  
Another reason to establish the MK 
is to receive a particular role of the MPR 
which related to a constitutional adjudi-
                                                          
11
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi & 
Konstitutionalisme Indonesia, Jakarta: MK-RI, 
3
rd
 Ed. 2006, p187. 
12
 Note 7. 
13
 Note 7, pp188-189 
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 This transfer of constitutional 
authority – from the MPR to the MK – is 
resulted from the structural change of the 
MPR itself that is now no longer serving 
as the highest state institution. The insti-
tutional structure in the post-amended 
UUD of 1945 implements the separation 
of powers that based on the principle of 
„checks and balances‟ relationship 
among the primary state institutions. In 
other words, the state powers are now 
equally shared by three branches – i.e.: 
legislative, executive and judiciary – that 
mutually control one another which re-
spect to the regulations determined in the 
Constitution.  
Theoretically, the existence of such 
Constitutional Court has associated with 
the case of Marbury vs. Madison in the 
United States of America in 1803
15
 – 
                                                          
14
 Note 7,  p250. 
15
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian 
Konstitusional di Berbagai Negara, 1
st
 Ed., 
Jakarta: MK-RI, 2006, p16-20. Marbury vs. 
Madison was a landmark United States Supreme 
Court case in which the Court formed the basis 
for the exercise of judicial review in the United 
States under Article III of the Constitution. The 
landmark decision helped define the boundary 
between the constitutionally separate executive 
and judicial branches of the American form of 
government. The case resulted from a petition to 
the Supreme Court by William Marbury, who 
had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the 
District of Columbia by President John Adams 
but whose commission was not subsequently 
delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court 
to force the new Secretary of State, James 
Madison, to deliver the documents. The Court, 
with John Marshall as Chief Justice, found firstly 
that Madison's refusal to deliver the commission 
was both illegal and correctible. Nonetheless, the 
Court stopped short of ordering Madison (by writ 
of mandamus) to hand over Marbury's 
commission, instead holding that the provision of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled Marbury 
to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was 
itself unconstitutional, since it purported to 
extend the Court's original jurisdiction beyond 
which, later on, became a hot topic that 
widely debated among experts. At the 
moment, there are 78 countries that have 
established Constitutional Court. Hence 
the presence of the MK in Indonesia 
should be seen at least from three things: 
firstly, as the worldwide constitutional 
practices; secondly, as the development 
of the constitutional theory, and; thirdly, 
as the practical need to reform the Indo-
nesian Constitution. 
The emergence of the Judicial 
Commission (KY) is actually motivated 
by the changing needs of the Supreme 
Court itself. The Supreme Court was 
originally served as the Supreme Court 
of public courts, religious courts, admin-
istrative courts, and military courts. Each 
of these courts has their own administra-
tions and jurisdictions – except the latest 
one that administered under the military 
organization. The idea to put all the four 
courts under one roof of the MA is in-
tended to provide justice for all that free 
from any interventions/ influences of 
other state powers. 
Previously, the controlling body to-
ward the behavior of the judges is as-
signed internally by the MA through the 
Panel of Honorary Judges (MKH). Such 
internal control is considered having 
some weaknesses and its account-ability 
is doubted by public because the process 
is not transparent. Therefore, an in-
dependent body is needed and the KY is 
formed. Hence the formation of the KY 
is intended to improve the supervision 
toward the judges. The amended-
Constitution authorizes the KY to pro-
vide recommendations on the appoint-
                                                                                
that which Article III established. The petition 
was therefore denied. 
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ment a Supreme Court justice as well as 
other authorities in order to preserve and 
uphold the honor, dignity, and the be-
havior of judges [Article 24B (1) of the 
amended-Constitution]. 
Another new invented institution in 
the amended-Constitution is the Com-
mission for General Elections (KPU). 
Like the KY, the KPU is also an inde-
pendent commission. The KPU manages 
for fair general elections. 
The overall constitutional changes 




Firstly, hierarchically, the state insti-
tutions having two layers, i.e.: in the first 
layer are the President and Vice-
President, the DPR, the DPD, the MPR, 
the MA, the MK, and the BPK; while in 
the second layer are the Ministers, the 
Military, the Police, the KY, the KPU, 
and the Central Bank. 
Secondly, functionality, the state in-
stitutions in the amended-Indonesian 
Constitution can be classified into pri-
mary state institutions and supporting 
state institutions.  
The primary state institutions are 
those institutions that operate the three 
branches of the state powers, i.e.: the 
legislative, the executive, and the judici-
ary. Within the scope of legislative 
power are the DPR, the DPD, and the 
MPR. Within the scope of executive 
power are the President and the Vice 
President. The Ministers that work to 
assist the President and the Vice Presi-
dent are also having executive functions 
as the primary state institutions. Lastly, 
                                                          
16
 Jimly Asshiddiqie,  Perkembangan dan Konso-
lidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi, Jakar-
ta: MK-RI, 2
nd
 Ed. 2006, pp99-127. 
within the scope of judicial powers, are 
the MA and the MK. 
The remaining state institutions as 
mentioned in the Constitution – i.e.: the 
BPK, the KY, the KPU, the Central 
Bank, the Ambassadors and Consuls, the 
Advisory Council for the President 
(Wantimpres), the TNI (National Mili-
tary), the National Police, and the Prose-
cutors – are classified as the supporting 
state institutions. 
Beyond these primary and sup-
porting state institutions that established 
by constitutional amendments, tens of 
auxiliary state institutions have been es-
tablished in response to demands for 
democratisation and public participation 
in governance, such as: the National Law 
Commission (KHN), the Ombudsman of 
the Republic of Indonesia (ORI – previ-
ously called the National Ombudsman 
Commission (KON), the National Com-
mission on Human Rights (KOMNAS 
HAM), the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), the Indonesian Po-
lice Commission (KOMPOLNAS), the 
Prosecutorial Commission, and so forth. 
All of these institutions have responsibil-
ity for the implementation of national 
law in Indonesia and, therefore, some-
how influencing the works of the consti-
tutional system in Indonesia. 
Such auxiliary state institutions, in 
principle, do not carry out the main func-
tions of the state powers. Most of those 
auxiliary state institutions are supporting 
the governmental functions, and some of 
them supporting the judiciary functions. 
However, at the moment, none of those 
auxiliary state institutions are working to 




 Sriwijaya Law Review  Vol. 2 Issue 1, January (2018) [ 51 ] 
 
The Consequences of the Ongoing 
Changes 
To support these institutional changes, 
especially in accordance with the presi-
dential system, direct election for the 
President and the Vice-President be-
comes very important in the establish-
ment of the presidency. The implementa-
tion of a direct presidential election for 
the first time in Indonesia was con-
ducted in 2004. This two-stage presiden-
tial elections was participated by more 
than 60 million voters out of 140 million 
registered voters. 
In a presidential system, the relation 
between the President and the DPR takes 
place according to their respective func-
tions. In nowadays Indonesia, it is inter-
esting to watch how the tensions appear 
be-tween these two institutions. The 
strengthened power of the DPR is one of 
the factors that contributing to the crea-
tions of counter-productive and unneces-
sary tensions. Another factor is a per-
sonal relation-ship between the President 
and the Vice President and their alliance 
political parties. These relationships are 
reflected in the composition of the Cabi-
net as well as the composition of the 
pro/con fractions of political parties in 
the DPR when they discussing the ex-
ecutive policies.  
It is a practical need of the Presi-
dent/Vice President to tie themselves 
with political parties in order to avoid 
stumbling blocks created by a coalition 
of political parties in the DPR. This need 
is especially true when the President is 
not come from a big political party.
17
 In 
                                                          
17
 The fact that an elected President/Vice 
President is not necessarily come from a big 
political party demonstrates that even big 
fact, the capability of the Executive to 
influence members of the DPR is play-
ing an important role in thwarting the 
use of the rights of the DPR members for 
interpellation and inquiry from within 
the DPR itself. Nevertheless, such ten-
sion is quite troublesome and damaging 
the image of the Executive. 
Similar phenomena – the tensions 
between the Local Governments and the 
Council of Local Representatives 
(DPRD) – are also occurs at the provin-
cial and district/city levels. The causes 
may be differs from one to another. One 
of the examples is the case in Lampung 
Province, i.e.: the tension between the 
Governor and the DPRD of Lampung. 
The current Governor of Lampung is the 
winner of the repeated/second local elec-
tions. Apparently, the Appeal Court de-
cides that the cancellation of the first lo-
cal elections is illegitimate, so that the 
repeated/second local elections and its 
results are not valid. This is the reason 
why the DPRD of Lampung refuses to 
cooperate with the current Governor. In 
fact that the Governor is also has a weak 
support from the majority political par-
ties in the DPRD of Lampung. While the 
elected Governor at the first local elec-
tions having a wide support from major-
ity political parties in the DPRD of 
Lampung. However, the Central Gov-
ernment rejects the results from the first 
local elections. 
The case of Lampung above illus-
trates a complex situation that contrib-
utes to the creation of tensions between 
the Local Executives and the DPRDs. 
Many other cases from other places have 
                                                                                
political parties do not significantly correlate 
with the people in grassroots level. 
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similar story but not the same causes like 
the case in Lampung. The dismissal of 
Nur Mahmudi Ismail as a Mayor of De-
pok is another example. He lost the Ap-
peal Court of West Java, but the Deci-
sion of this West Java Appeal Court is 
later annulled by the Supreme Court. 
Although it is just the beginning that 
Indonesia experiencing the general and 
local elections for the Executives, but 
there is an impression of the symptoms 
of tensions occurs between the Execu-
tives and the Legislatures. This situation 
is recalling to the era of the 1950s. It is 
feared that the constitutional changes is 
followed by bad practices if the majority 
of the Indonesian people are not involve 
in the statehood maturation processes. 
Another thing is the tendency of the 
politicians – who are holding executive 
or legislative offices, in the central or 
locals – to start anticipate the next gen-
eral/local elections even though they 
have just run their services for two years 
– out of the five years of their terms. So, 
no one really focus working on his/her 
real duties. The so-called political 
imaginary (politik pencitraan) is truly 
sucked [limited] the national political 
energy. 
It is also important to pointing out 
the impacts of the regional autonomy as 
created by the Law No. 22 of 1999 with 
regard to the Central–Local as well as 
Provincial–District/City relations. The 
Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local Govern-
ance amended the Law No. 5 of 1974 on 
Local Governance and the Law No. 5 of 
1970 on Village Governance. As a reac-
tion to the previous laws on local gov-
ernance, this Law No. 22 of 1999 re-
forms the previous laws and provides a 
broad local autonomy.  
In the implementation of local 
autonomy, local government administers 
their territories by their own self, includ-
ing in managing the natural resources in 
their areas. In some cases, the resource-
rich regions experience a surplus, while 
the poor areas rely on other economic 
sources – such as retributions and other 
income created through the local regula-
tions. As a result, many local regula-
tions, including those that regulate the 
licenses, are complained by the business 
people because of their additional costs. 
Apart from that, there are also some 
populist local regulations, such as on 
health care services, education, and other 
things that benefit the community. How-
ever, it is suspected that the stipulation 
of those local regulations is motivated by 
political interests of the local elites who 
are anticipating the upcoming local elec-
tions. 
The changes in local governances 
due to the concept of an almost „perfect 
de-centralization‟18 is motivated the Law 
No. 22 of 1999 on Local Governance 
that following up the constitutional 
changes of the Chapter VI on Local 
                                                          
18
 Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State, 
New York: Russell & Russel, 1973, p313.  “We 
speak of perfect decentralization when the 
creation of local norms is final and independent. 
It final when there is no possibility that the local 
norm may be abolished and replaced by central 
norm. The division of the legislative power in the 
federal State between a central and several local 
organs furnishes an examples of decentralization 
that is not final…The creation of local norms is 
independent if their contents are in no way 
determined by central norms. Decentralization is 
accordingly imperfect when a central law 
contains the general principles to which local 
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Governance Articles 18, 18A and 18B of 
the amended-Constitution. The concept 
of decentralization is about dispersal of 
the powers in administering the state 
constitutionally. Therefore, the auton-
omy based on the concept of decentrali-
zation should continuously be observed 
in both normatively and practices. 
The consequences in changing the 
concept of autonomy affect the pattern 
of Central–Local relationships. Theoreti-
cally, the multi-layered of government in 
a federal state is aim to prevent the 
domination of the authority of the Fed-
eral Government.
19
 Separation of the ter-
ritorial powers can be seen as a control 
toward the state powers as well as to re-








                                                          
19
Alan Norton, International Handbook of Local 
and Regional Government: A Comparative 
Analysis of Advanced Democracies, Suffolk: The 
Ipswich Book Company, reprinted in 1997, 
pp26-27. 
20
Harun Alrasyid, in Adnan Buyung Nasution, 
Harun Alrasid, Ichlasul Amal, et.al, Federalisme 
Untuk Indonesia,2
nd
 Ed., Jakarta: Kompas, 2000, 
pp9-10. discusses the terminology of central and 
local, whereas central government is usually 
used in a unitary state, while in a federal state the 
central/federal government is usually called the 
national government. From a legal perspective, a 
more precise term used state and region and both 
are legal entities. 
21
 Note 16. p71. Also see Jean Jaques Rousseau, 
Discourse on Political Economy and The Social 
Contract, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994, p64. “Sovereignty is indivisible for the 
same reason that it is untransferable: a will is 
either general, or it is not; it is the will of the 
body of the people, or of a part only.”; Also see 
Jean Jaques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 
London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1991, p201. 
“Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it 
inalienable, is indivisible; for will either is, or is 
not, general; it is the will either of body of the 
people, or only of a part of it.”  
the entire power of the state is owned by 
the Central Government. It means that 
the Central Government rules and shapes 
the composition of the Local Govern-
ments, including the types and the wide 
of the autonomy which is in accord to its 
own initiative. An autonomous region, 
according to Wolhoff, is also organizing 
and assisting the Central Government 
activities in the region (medebewind). 
The Central Government remains con-
trolling the supervisory toward the 
autonomous regions.
22
 In principle, in a 
unitary state, the authority re-mains in 
the hands of the Central Government for 
any intensive interventions to the local 
areas. However, these authorities re-
ferred only in a general formulation in a 
constitution.
23
 The Central Government 
is entitled to regulate the whole country, 
while the Local Governments are author-
ized to regulate and manage their own 
areas in so long that they have not been 
regulated by the Central Government.
24
 
If it is carefully observed, the Cen-
tral–Local relationship in the post-
amended UUD of 1945, especially after 
the enactment of the Law No. 22 of 
1999, tends to shift to the characteristics 
of a federal state. One of the evidence is 
that the Central Government almost lost 
its control toward the Local Govern-
ments in exercising their local auton-
omy. Meanwhile, the relation-ship be-
tween the Provincial Government and 
                                                          
22
G. J. Wolhoff,Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata 
Negara Republik Indonesia, Jakarta: Timun Mas 
NV, 1955, pp96-97. 
23
Amrah Muslimin,  Aspek-Aspek Hukum 
Otonomi Daerah, Bandung: Alumni, 1978, p17 
24
R. Tresna, Bertamasya Ke Taman 
Ketatanegaraan, Bandung: Dibya, N/A, pp29-
30. 
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the District/Municipality Governments 
can be said functionally disconnected. 
Since the enactment of the Law No. 32 
of 2004, the local autonomy shift to the 
„relative autonomy model.‟25 
 
CONCLUSION 
The revolutionary constitutional changes 
have happened in Indonesia and the im-
plementation of these constitutional 
changes is continuing underway every 
single day so that growing the impacts of 
these constitutional changes into many 
sectors/fields and all governmental lev-
els – from the central to the provincial to 
                                                          
25
Gerry  Stoker  in Richard Batley and Gerry 
Stoker (ed), Local Government in Europe, 1991, 
p5-6. “The relative model, this model gives an 
independence to local authorities while not 
denying the reality of the nation state. The 
emphasis is on giving freedom of action to local 
authorities within a defined framework of powers 
and duties. Central government relations with 
local authorities are therefore determined largely 
by legislation. Controls are limited. Local 
authorities raise most of their revenue through 
direct taxation. Within the relative autonomy 
model local authorities may pursue policies 
which they share with central government or 
which differ from those advocated by central 
government.” The Agency Model, this is the 
model in which local authorities are seen mainly 
as agencies for carrying out central government‟s 
policies. This is ensured by detailed specification 
in legislation, the development of regulations and 
the operation of controls. The interaction model, 
(In this model it is difficult to define the spheres 
of action of central and local government, 
because they are involved in a complex pattern 
of relations, in which the emphasis is on mutual 
influence. The political processes of central and 
local government are closely inter-related-
possibly through the dual mandate-with issues 
often being resolved by mutual discussion. The 
officers of both levels are closely involved in 
joint discussion of projects and plans. In this 
model it is difficult to define responsibilities, 
since emphasis is on working together. Local 
government finance will involve both taxes and 
grants, but taxes may be shared and grant levels 
protected.” 
the district/ municipality to the village 
governances. For academic circles, these 
constitutional changes and their impacts 
are a challenging subject to be studied. It 
is most likely that such constitutional 
studies will provide the explanations on 
the particular circumstances and the spe-
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